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This paper aims at testing empirically the three major theoretical reasons why 
banks resort to collateral: reduction of loan loss in the event of default, adverse 
selection, and moral hazard. This investigation is performed by testing whether the 
reasons vary according to the type of collateral. We use a unique dataset of bank loans 
granted to French distressed firms, which contains the full information on debt 
contract characteristics, including the cause of default, the type and the value of all 
collaterals. 
Our work suggests that information asymmetries are not of prime importance in 
the decision of the bank to secure a loan, as no type of collateral helps to solve 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems. The reduction of the loan loss and the 
observed-risk hypothesis may however explain the use of collateral. 
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This paper aims at testing empirically the three major theoretical reasons why 
banks resort to collateral: reduction of loan loss in the event of default, adverse 
selection, and moral hazard. This investigation is performed by testing whether the 
reasons vary according to the type of collateral. We use a unique dataset of bank loans 
granted to French distressed firms, which contains the full information on debt 
contract characteristics, including the cause of default, the type and the value of all 
collaterals. 
Our work suggests that information asymmetries are not of prime importance in 
the decision of the bank to secure a loan, as no type of collateral helps to solve 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems. The reduction of the loan loss and the 
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I. Introduction 
 
There is widespread evidence regarding the massive use of collateral by banks 
for firm loans. In European countries, Davydenko and Franks (2005) observe that 
75.7% of firm loans in France and 88.5% in Germany are secured, whereas Gonas et 
al. (2004) point out that 73% of loans are secured for US firm loans, which is similar 
to the order of magnitude provided by Berger and Udell (1990). 
It is therefore of interest to know why banks use collateral. Theoretical literature 
on this topic can be broadly summarized in three arguments. First, collateral allows a 
reduction of the loan loss for the bank in the event of default of the loan. Indeed it 
provides the bank with a prior title on specific assets. Second, collateral helps solve 
the problem of adverse selection borne by the bank when lending, as it constitutes a 
signalling instrument providing the bank with some valuable information. Collateral 
helps the bank obtain private information owned by the borrower, as high-quality 
borrowers are more induced to accept to provide collateral in compensation of a low 
loan rate than low-quality borrowers are. Third, collateral helps solve the problem of 
moral hazard after the loan is granted. Namely, the borrower is not inclined to provide 
the optimal effort or the optimal level of investment. This mechanism is rooted in the 
binding role of collateral on the borrower which favors the alignment of his interests 
on the bank’s. 
We can however inquire about the empirical relevance of these theoretical 
arguments. Indeed, collateral triggers monitoring and legal costs, which might be 
large enough to offset the advantages of requiring a collateral for a bank. More 
important, while both arguments based on information asymmetries intimate a 
negative relationship between risk of default and collateral, there is a commonly 
accepted view among bankers that riskier loans would be associated with more 
collateral. The rationale is that banks would be able to sort the borrowers from 
information they have on their quality. As a result, they would charge riskier 
borrowers with higher loan rates and require higher collateral from these borrowers. 
Theories on the use of collateral would then fail to explain its widespread use. 
The empirical validation of these theories is therefore a major issue to 
understand why banks ask for collateral in lending decisions. However, only a few 
empirical studies have tested the relevance of these arguments. Berger and Udell 
(1990) focused on the role of collateral as a signalling instrument in an investigation   4
of the link between the presence of collateral and the risk premium on US loans. 
Jimenez and Saurina (2004) analyzed the influence on the collateral of the probability 
of default on Spanish bank loans. Finally, several works tested determinants of 
collateralization to study firm and loan characteristics with which the presence of a 
collateral is associated (e.g. Leeth and Scott, 1989; Gonas et al., 2004). 
The aim of this paper is to provide new empirical evidence on the three 
theoretical reasons of the use of collateral by banks. This evidence is based on a 
dataset of 564 bank loans from French distressed firms. This unique dataset supplies 
detailed information on the type and the value of each collateral, but also the reasons 
of the default. The dataset comes from three major French commercial banks, and was 
collected manually from their internal recovery unit. It enables three major 
contributions to the empirical literature on the use of collateral. 
First, we investigate the influence of the collateral type. Indeed, one can expect 
that all types of collateral are not equivalent for banks. It seems notably intuitive that 
an outside collateral – namely an asset outside the borrowing firm – is more binding 
than an inside collateral. As a consequence, outside collaterals should have a greater 
contribution than inside collaterals for the resolution of adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems. This is therefore a fundamental issue in the analysis of the use of 
collateral, as results may differ according to the collateral type. However, no study 
has ever analyzed thoroughly this question, as most works content themselves to test 
the fact that the loan is secured or not. 
Second, we provide a complete empirical framework to test on a common 
sample the three theoretical arguments explaining the use of collateral by banks.   
While some papers have tested one of these arguments, none has ever investigated 
simultaneously all these arguments, which makes it hard to compare their relevance to 
explain the use of collateral. 
Third, we perform an exceptional investigation of the role of collateral on moral 
hazard problems. Our database on loans from distressed companies includes 
qualitative information on the causes of default. As a consequence, our study is the 
first one defining the occurrence of moral hazard according to the real causes of 
default. This is a major contribution in the understanding of the role of collateral to 
solve moral hazard problems. 
As a consequence, our work constitutes a fundamental contribution to the 
empirical literature on the use of collateral by banks. The paper is organized as   5
follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical and empirical background on the use of 
collateral by banks. Section 3 describes the data and variables. In section 4, we 
develop the methodology and the empirical results. We finally provide some 
concluding remarks in section 5. 
 
II. Background 
This section first explains thoroughly the theoretical arguments of the use of 
collateral by banks. We then tackle the question of knowing whether these arguments 
are empirically validated. 
 
II.1 Theoretical background 
Theoretical literature gives three major reasons for the use of collateral by 
banks. This subsection is designed to develop each of them. We must first define what 
an inside and an outside collateral are, as some of the theoretical arguments on the 
role of collateral deal with this definition. An inside collateral is an asset owned by 
the firm, which is granted the loan. It can be among other things: account receivables, 
inventories or fixed assets. In opposition, an outside collateral is an asset, the firm 
does not own. It is typically a guarantee from firm owners or from the firm group. 
First, a bank is inclined to ask for collateral as it reduces loan loss in the event 
of default. Indeed collateral confers the bank a title on specific assets. An inside 
collateral is useful for the bank as it increases its priority if the firm defaults. An 
outside collateral suspends the limited liability of the firm, as it gives the bank 
property on an asset outside the firm. It has to be stressed that this intuitive reason is 
independent of information asymmetries between the borrower and the bank. This is a 
major difference with both other reasons for the use of collateral. 
Second, collateral may solve the problem of adverse selection thanks to the 
better information owned by the borrower in comparison to the bank before the 
lending decision. This private information may lead to credit rationing because of the 
inability of the bank to price the loan according to the borrower’s quality (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981). Therefore, high-quality borrowers have incentives to show their quality, 
using a credible signal, meaning a signal that can not be provided by low-quality 
borrowers. Collateral is such a signal, as it is more costly for low-quality borrowers 
since they have a higher chance of defaulting and hence of losing the collateral 
(Bester, 1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987). Consequently,   6
as collateral acts as a signalling device, it conveys valuable information on the 
borrower to the bank, which can then screen borrowers by offering the choice 
between a secured loan with a low interest rate and an unsecured loan with a high 
interest rate. A high-quality borrower will be inclined to choose the loan with a 
collateral as its low risk of default means a low probability to lose collateral and a 
high probability to repay interest. 
This argument is particularly relevant in the case of outside collateral, since the 
cost for the borrower of providing such collateral is obvious. Its role is however by no 
means insignificant for inside collateral because of their costs. Indeed, an inside 
collateral is costly for a borrower as its use makes subsequent loans more expensive 
by reducing the assets available for future collateralisation. 
Third, collateral can reduce the problem of moral hazard after the borrower has 
obtained the loan, by putting down his incentives to invest in riskier projects or to 
minimize his effort to ensure the success of the project for which loan was granted 
(Boot, Thakor and Udell, 1991). Indeed the bank can align the borrower’s interest 
with its own using collateral, as it imposes a greater loss on the borrower in case of 
default. It is all the more valid in the case of outside collateral, since this kind of 
collateral extends the limited liability of the borrower to external assets. 
Therefore, both latter arguments suggest a negative link between collateral and 
credit risk, as a secured loan would be associated with a higher quality of borrowers 
and a lower probability of ex post moral hazard behavior. However, the fact that 
collateral is associated with greater credit risk has gone mainstream among bankers as 
mentioned by Berger and Udell (1990) and Jimenez and Saurida (2004). The rationale 
underlying this argument is that banks can sort the borrowers from information they 
have on their quality. Consequently they charge riskier borrowers with higher rates, 
and simultaneously require more collateral from these borrowers following the first 
theoretical reason for the use of collateral: since collateral reduces its loss, the bank 
would be more inclined ceteris paribus to demand collateral to clients with a higher 
credit risk. This argument is commonly called the observed-risk hypothesis. 
 
II.2 Empirical background 
In spite of the substantial amount of empirical literature devoted to banking 
issues, studies accounting for the reasons of the use of collateral are impressively 
scarce. A likely reason for this deficit might be the difficulties to find loan-level data   7
on collateral. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that only a very limited set of these 
studies have directly tested some of the three theoretical arguments regarding the use 
of collateral. 
Berger and Udell (1990) investigate the relationship between collateral and 
credit risk on a sample of 1 million loans from US banks. In a first part, these authors 
test the hypothesis that adverse selection matters for the use of collateral by regressing 
the risk premium on a set of loan characteristics including a dummy variable 
considering whether the loan is collateralized or not. The conclusion does not 
corroborate the adverse selection argument, as a positive and significant relationship 
is observed between collateral and risk premium. This result may be explained by the 
fact that banks require more collateral from riskier borrowers who are also charged 
with higher loan rates. 
In a second part, several ex post measures of risk, including net charge-offs to 
loans and loan payments past due to loans, are regressed on a set of borrower 
characteristics aggregating information by loan, so that this regression is performed at 
the borrower’s level. They observe that collateral is associated with credit risk. As a 
consequence, this work concludes in favor of a positive relationship between 
collateral and credit risk, which prompts banks to ask more collateral from riskier 
companies, and consequently to charge them with higher loan rates. 
Jimenez and Saurina (2004) focus on the determinants of the probability of 
default of bank loans on a wide set of 3 million loans provided by Spanish banks. 
Probability of default is considered as an ex post credit risk measure. Therefore they 
test whether both arguments of the use of collateral based on information asymmetries 
are validated, namely whether the presence of collateral brings down the probability 
of default. The probability of default is explained by a set of loan characteristics 
including some information on the collateral. Three dummy variables depending on 
the collateralized share of the loan are jointly taken into account in the model. They 
find a greater probability of default for secured loans. 
A few papers focus on a closely related issue, relationship lending. First of all, 
Berger and Udell (1995)’s work is remarkable as it constitutes the only one to our 
knowledge taking in a limited way the type of collateral into account. Namely, 
dummy variables are included for receivables and inventories, other firm assets or 
outside collateral. This work analyzes the associations among collateral, banking 
relationship and risk premium on a sample of 1 million loans from US banks. It   8
provides some support on the positive association between collateral and risk 
premium, and clear evidence that firms with longer banking relationships are less 
likely to pledge collateral. Consequently, this work tends to support the view that 
collateral is associated with greater risk. Both papers explaining a dummy variable 
considering whether the loan is collateralized or not, Harhoff and Körting (1998) 
conclude similarly on 994 loans from German banks, while Degryse and van Cayseele 
(2000)’s work on 18 000 loans from one important Belgian bank provides mixed 
evidence on this issue. 
A couple of works investigating the determinants of collateralization need also 
to be mentioned, as they analyze the link between the use of collateral and the risk 
perceived by the bank. Most of these studies explain whether the loan is secured or 
not with loan-based data. The seminal paper on this topic is Leeth and Scott (1989), 
testing several determinants of the binary decision of the bank to secure the collateral 
or not on a sample of 2000 US loans. Notable results are the negative influence of age 
on the presence of a collateral and the non-significance of size. Similarly, Cowling 
(1999) investigates the determinants of collateralization on a sample of 272 firm loans 
in the United Kingdom. The tested hypothesis is the link between risk and collateral, 
and consequently tested determinants proxy risk (age, size, limited liability). The 
author concludes to a positive effect of risk on loan collateralization. 
In a broader perspective, Gonas et al. (2004) investigate the determinants of 
collateralization on a sample of 7600 US loans by proxying each of the three 
theoretical reasons of the use of collateral. The presence of adverse selection 
problems is expected to be lower either when the firm has a rating, is listed, larger, or 
domestic. Moral hazard problems are assumed to increase with the loan maturity. 
Finally, credit risk should be inversely related to the quality of the firm rating. The 
nature of the proxies for each theoretical argument need to be stressed, given the 
interpretations of the paper. However, the conclusions of the paper are rather mixed 
with some evidence in favor of each theory, with the expected sign for all variables 
related to adverse selection, moral hazard and risk reduction of the loan loss, even if 
there are some ambiguous elements. 
Hulburt and Scherr (2003) also analyze the determinants of the collateralization, 
with a notable exception: the dependent variable is defined by the ratio of secured 
debt to total debt at the firm level. The work is performed on a sample of two yearly 
samples of about 4000 small companies each. The explaining variables tested are then   9
also defined as firm characteristics which constitute a major limitation to the study for 
our focus. Most notable results include the positive sign of age and the negative sign 
of size. As both variables proxy the risk of the company, these results show mixed 
evidence regarding the link between risk and collateralization. 
Finally, the recent study from Jimenez et al. (2006) takes a broader perspective 
by analyzing a wide range of determinants of the presence of collateral.  Tested 
determinants include the characteristics of the borrower with credit quality, but also 
the characteristics of the lender, the competition on the loan market and the 
macroeconomic conditions. Credit quality is related to the theories of the use of 
collateral by banks. It is proxied by a dummy variable taking into account the fact that 
the borrower had recently a loan in default. The authors then observe that the credit 
quality of the borrower is the main determinant of the use of collateral. 
This survey on the empirical literature on the motives of the use of collateral 
can be summarized in three points. First, it appears that empirical evidence is rather in 
favor of the observed-risk hypothesis according to which riskier borrowers are 
required to provide more often collateral, in accordance with the common opinion of 
bankers. This element tends to invalidate the theoretical arguments on the use of 
collateral dealing with information asymmetries. Second, studies investigating 
directly these arguments are very scarce. Furthermore, no study provides a complete 
framework allowing to test successively the three theoretical assumptions on the same 
sample of loans. Third, all works only consider the fact that the loan is secured or not, 
if we except two works considering in a limited way the type and the value of 
collateral (Berger and Udell, 1995; Jimenez and Saurida, 2004). This is a major 
limitation of these works, as the characteristics of the collateral can likely influence 
the results. Our empirical work is fitted to improve the former literature relative to 
these drawbacks. 
 
III. Data and variables 
We collect a sample of 735 credit lines attached to 386 French distressed firms, 
whose debt exposure exceeds 100 thousand euros. The year of default lies between 
1993 and 2003. Loans were granted from 1984 to 2001. The sample comes from a 
larger database we collected between 2004 and 2005 under S&P Risk Solution 
supervision. The “default” event follows the Basel II definition: a firm defaults as 
soon as delays on its financial commitments exceed 90 days. Data come from three   10
major French commercial banks, and were collected manually from their internal 
recovery unit. 
We focus our analysis on distressed firms in order to take two major issues into 
account. First, we aim at investigating the recovery power of each collateral after the 
event of default of the borrower.
1 However collateral is only recovered by the bank in 
the event of default. Second, we also analyze the influence of collateral to solve moral 
hazard issues. However moral hazard behavior can only be discovered following an 
audit procedure implemented by the bank, and such verification only takes place in 
the event of default. 
We classify collaterals in six types. Two types are outside collaterals: 
guarantees from individuals, and guarantees from companies. The four other types are 
inside collaterals: mortgage, long-term assets other than mortgage, short-term assets, 
other kinds of collateral. 
After we dropped credit lines with missing information for our study, we keep 
564 credit lines which constitute the sample of the estimations. Table 1 summarizes 
our sample structure, focusing respectively on firms and on credit lines. The list of all 
variables used is described in table A.1 in the Appendix. The sample is composed of a 
majority of small and medium companies. French firms massively use overdraft, and 
discount for their short-term financial needs. Investment relies on long-term fixed 
interest rates. Let’s notice that the share of collateralized loans is rather high (74.5%) 
whereas final recovered amounts on such collateral never exceed 40%. Moreover, 
banks concentrate their collateralization policy on a few types of collateral: 
guarantees from individuals (43.6%) and to a lesser degree mortgage (18.6%). Kinds 
of collateral on long-term (15.2%) and short-term (14.4%) assets are of second 
importance. We shall see later that such banks’ behavior may traduce inappropriate 
choices: guarantees from individuals and mortgages are associated to a higher 
individual risk and are less efficient, taking into account the legal environment and the 
volatility of some economic assets which support the collateral. 
 
                                                           
1 It has to be stressed that all collaterals are pledged to the loan when the credit line is granted.   11
IV. Methodology and results 
This section is organized so as to investigate each reason of the use of collateral 
in turn. Namely the first subsection analyzes the role of collateral to reduce loan loss 
in the event of default, while the second and third subsections respectively study the 
influence of collateral to solve the adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
 
IV.1 Does collateral reduce loan loss in the event of default? 
An intuitive motivation for the use of collateral in the loan contracts is that it 
permits a reduction of the loan loss in the event of the default of the loan. However, 
one can wonder whether the presence of a collateral in a loan contract significantly 
reduces loan loss. Furthermore, the impact of collateral in terms of reduction of the 
loan loss is likely to be influenced by the type and value of collateral. Namely not all 
collateral provides the same titles to the bank. 
We therefore provide several estimations to investigate the assumed impact of 
collateral on the loan loss ratio. This ratio is defined as the ratio of loan loss to loan 
amount.
2 We include several dummy variables to control for various effects: one if the 
legal status of the borrower includes limited liability (LimitedLiability), one if the 
borrower is part of a group (Group), one if the last internal rating estimated by the 
bank before the default of the borrower is unknown because of the lack of satisfactory 
information (UnknownRating), one if the last internal rating estimated by the bank 
before the default considers the borrower as solvent (GoodRating). Exposure at 
default is also considered, including all the due amounts plus the discounted 
commitments (EAD).
3 A measure of the excessive use of the credit line is also 
included: the ratio of used amount to the initial amount granted (Excess). 
Finally, we include some dummy variables for the type of loan: Overdraft, 
STFixed,  STVariable,  LTFixed,  LTVariable,  Discount represent dummy variables 
equal to one respectively if the loan is an overdraft, a short-term loan with fixed rate, 
a short-term loan with variable rate, a long-term loan with fixed rate, a long-term loan 
with variable rate, a discount. The dummy variable Overdraft is dropped in order to 
avoid collinearity between complementary dummies. 
                                                           
2 Loan loss is built using both actual recovered amounts and discounted expected amounts: the discount 
rate varies with the maturity and date of lending. Expectations use probabilities of recovery which take 
into account qualitative information (written remarks from the recovery unit regarding the client) and 
the nature of the assets pledged as collaterals. 
3 The discount rate varies with the maturity and date of lending.   12
We first test whether the fact that the loan is secured reduces significantly the 
loan loss ratio, defined as loan loss divided by loan amount. In this goal, we perform a 
regression of this ratio on a dummy variable (Collateral) equal to one whether the 
loan is secured or to zero else. The results are described in table 2. Based upon the 
value of the adjusted R² statistic, the fit of the equations is rather satisfactory. We 
used the condition index of Besley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) to assess the collinearity 
of the model.
4 The multicollinearity of the regressions appears satisfactory. 
We observe a negative coefficient for Collateral which is significant at the 1% 
level. This intuitive result supports the expectation that a secured loan reduces the 
loan loss in the event of default of the company. Turning to the control variables, it is 
of interest to point out the significant and negative sign of EAD and Excess. These 
results suggest the role of the effort of the bank in the recovery process. Namely, the 
bank supplies a greater effort in this process when the exposure at default and the 
excessive use of the credit line are greater. We also observe a significant and positive 
sign for LimitedLiability, which is in accordance with the intuition. 
These estimations have then shown that the presence of collateral reduces the 
loan loss of the bank in the event of default. However a major issue for a bank is also 
to know how much it can recover from each type of collateral. In this aim, we have to 
provide a model linking the recovered value of a collateral to its initial value. 
Consequently, we now present a model on secured loans explaining the recovered 
value of each collateral. Furthermore, we want to take into account simultaneous 
effects between recovered amounts on every collateral. A competition might indeed 
happen between types of collateral which are used to secure a loan, notably because 
the bank might choose to concentrate its efforts on the recovery of one collateral to 
the detriment of the others. Therefore, we model six simultaneous equations so that 
we have one equation per collateral. The variable explained is the logarithm of the 
recovered value for each collateral (IndivRecovered for guarantees from individuals 
and so on), while the main explaining variable is the logarithm of the initial value of 
the collateral at the time of the lending decision (IndivInitial for guarantees from 
                                                           
4 According to these authors, the multicollinearity is considered as very weak for an index below 10, 
moderate when the index ranges from 10 and 30, excessive and biasing the estimations if the index is 
above 30.   13
individuals and so on). We use a Three-Stage Least Squares estimation method for the 
global estimation of the model.
5 
The results of this model are displayed in table 3. As expected, the initial value 
of collateral has a significantly positive influence on the recovered value of collateral, 
whatever the type of collateral. The initial and recovered values of each collateral are 
in logarithm, meaning that their coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. A 
greater coefficient of the initial value of a collateral means therefore a greater 
recovery power. Thus, when we consider the coefficients of the initial value so as to 
measure the sensitivity of the recovered value to the initial value, a hierarchy of the 
kinds of collateral dawns. In descending order, the “best” collateral is guarantees from 
companies with a coefficient of 0.391. This can be explained by the fact that this 
collateral is based on the wealth of other companies than the distressed one. The other 
kinds of collateral have a coefficient of 0.349, which may result from the high legal 
protection associated with leasing and the French-specific “privilège de prêteur de 
deniers immobilier”. This latter collateral deals with the real estate loans. It gives a 
higher position in the absolute priority order and is based on the complete assets of 
the company. Leasing guarantees to the bank that there is no property transfer until 
the bank is fully repaid. 
Then, the third “best” collateral is mortgage, namely a collateral on a non-
volatile asset. The following collateral is short-term assets, which includes volatile 
assets such as receivables and stocks but also the non-volatile cash. Finally, both 
“worst” kinds of collateral in terms of the recovered value in comparison to the initial 
value are guarantees from individuals and long-term assets other than mortgage. 
Their relatively weak power of recovery may be accounted as follows. Even if a 
guarantee from an individual is an outside collateral which appears particularly 
satisfactory for a bank, it can be provided to cover several bank loans. Consequently 
the wealth of the guarantor can be shared between several banks. An additional 
argument is that a distressed firm may have already contributed to reduce the personal 
wealth of its managers, as the increasing difficulties of the firm urge managers or 
other possible providers of guarantees to increase their invested funds in the firm. The 
                                                           
5 Following the Three-Stage OLS method, we first use a Double-Stage OLS method (i.e. we use the 
reduced form of the model to regress exogenous instruments on endogenous variables  : predicted 
values are taken back to the right side of the initial model, which can be estimated using simple OLS 
method). Then, first-stage residuals are used for the estimation of the relationship between random 
effects attached to each equation. Then, we use GLS method for the estimation of the whole model.   14
weakness of the coefficient of long-term assets other than mortgage may come from 
the poor recovered value on intangible fixed assets. 
When we analyze the coefficients of the recovered values of the other kinds of 
collateral, we observe negative signs which are significant in many cases. Two 
explanations may be provided on this result. On the one hand, the presence of a 
collateral tends to reduce the presence and therefore the recovered value of other 
kinds of collateral. On the other hand, a greater value of one collateral incites the bank 
to concentrate its efforts on the recovery of this collateral to the detriment of other 
kinds of collateral. Both effects traduce a competition between different types of 
collateral. 
We conclude here that collateral exerts a positive and significant role to reduce 
the loan loss of the bank in the event of default of the loan. However important 
differences remain between the types of collateral in terms of recovered value for a 
given initial value. Namely, guarantees from companies, other kinds of collateral, and 
mortgage are in descending order the types of collateral which provide the greatest 
value recovered. It has to be stressed that the differences between the kinds of 
collateral do not follow the distinction between outside and inside collateral. This 
results notably from the legal differences among collateral. 
 
IV.2 Does collateral mitigate adverse selection problems? 
This subsection aims at analyzing the role of collateral to solve adverse 
selection problems. Theoretical literature suggests that collateral may constitute a 
signalling instrument and consequently it may help the bank obtain private 
information owned by the borrower. According to this argument, we should observe a 
negative link between the presence of collateral and the risk premium, as high-quality 
firms would be inclined to provide a collateral in exchange of a lower risk premium. 
To test this hypothesis, we estimate a simultaneous equations model 
incorporating interdependencies between risk premium and the collateral values. 
Indeed, the relationship between collateral values and risk premium is assumed to be 
bidirectional, meaning that collateral values influence risk premium and vice versa. 
The rationale underlying this argument comes from Bester (1985) who considers a 
relationship between presence of collateral and risk premium, without assuming any 
direction for this link.   15
Furthermore, considering separately each type of collateral allows investigating 
the potential differences between collaterals in their role to mitigate adverse selection 
problems. Consequently, we model seven simultaneous equations so that we have one 
equation for each of the six collateral values and one equation for risk premium. The 
variables explained are therefore the ratio of the initial value of each type of collateral 
on the loan amount (IndivValue for guarantees from individuals and so on) and the 
risk premium. Risk premium is defined as the difference between the loan rate and a 
prime rate. The definition of prime rates is debatable. A first choice would be the use 
of all available prime rates for all maturities, and then to consider that the prime rate 
of a loan would be the one corresponding to the maturity of this loan. However 
practical evidence indicates that this view does not square with the reality of French 
bankers. Indeed, it is notably argued that French bankers use some reference rates for 
short-term and long-term loans as pointed out by practitioners (Galesne, 1999; Les 
Echos, 2004). Therefore, we choose to use as prime rate either the rate provided by 
the database, when the loan is based on a variable rate, or a reference rate depending 
on the maturity of the loan: the TBB (“taux de base bancaire”) for short-term loans, 
the TME (“taux mensuel des emprunts d’Etat”) for long-term loans. 
Control variables include information on loan size (LoanSize), on the length of 
the relationship between the bank and the borrower (RelationshipLength), the duration 
of the loan (Duration), and dummy variables for the type of loan (we drop the dummy 
variable for overdraft. Furthermore, we include the sum of the initial values of all 
other types of collateral than the one explained to the loan amount 
(AllOtherCollValue) in each equation explaining each of the six collateral values to 
take into account the fact that a type of collateral obtained exerts an influence on the 
other obtained types of collateral. 
The results of the simultaneous equations model are displayed in table 4. In the 
first equation explaining Risk premium, we observe that all collateral variables are 
positive and significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, in the equations explaining 
collateral variables, the coefficient for the risk premium is always positive and 
significant at the 1% level. As a consequence, our results tend to support a positive 
relationship between collateral and risk premium. This evidence does not support the 
theoretical argument according to which collateral helps solve the problem of adverse 
selection. In contrast, it corroborates the observed-risk hypothesis according to which 
banks would ask for more collateral from riskier companies, which are already   16
charged with higher loan rates. We then support the empirical evidence provided by 
Berger and Udell (1990), who also observe a positive link between the presence of 
collateral and risk premium on US companies. This finding is observed for all kinds 
of collateral. We notably observe no difference between inside collaterals and outside 
collaterals. Therefore, no type of collateral helps to solve adverse selection problems. 
Turning to the control variables, a striking result is the negative and significant 
coefficient of AllOtherCollValue which shows that the value of each type of collateral 
is reduced by the other obtained types of collateral as expected. 
In summary, our tests do not support the hypothesis of a collateral helping 
banks solve adverse selection problems, whatever the collateral. They rather provide 
evidence in favor of the observed-risk hypothesis according to which banks charge 
greater loan rates and ask for collateral to riskier companies. 
 
IV.3 Does collateral solve moral hazard? 
In this subsection, we concentrate on the possible role of collateral to alleviate 
moral hazard problems. The reasoning behind this theoretical argument is that 
collateral favors the alignment of the interests of the borrower on the interests of the 
bank. It has to be stressed that this argument is particularly relevant in the case of 
outside collateral, since this collateral extends the limited liability of the borrower to 
assets outside the firm. 
Our dataset allows us to have very sharp information on the presence of moral 
hazard. Indeed, it includes only distressed firms and provides exhaustive information 
on the causes of default. Consequently, we do not need to use some uncertain proxies 
for moral hazard but we rather define the occurrence of moral hazard according to the 
real causes of default. 
To test the role of collateral in reducing the probability of moral hazard, we rely 
on a binomial logit model. The explained variable is a dummy variable equal to one if 
moral hazard lies among the causes of default, and zero else. This variable is built 
from full qualitative information on the causes of default, which is included in our 
database. Indeed, when a firm enters into the recovery unit of the bank, an 
investigation is performed in order to discover the causes of default. This literal 
information written by the bank employee in charge of the recovery was classified in 
49 codes to allow a systematic analysis of the causes of default. Following theoretical 
literature on moral hazard, this controversial definition includes underinvestment,   17
asset substitution and weak managerial effort. Consequently, we consider all the 
causes linked to these three items as a moral hazard case. Namely, we then take all the 
causes connected to the internal reasons of faulty management. These causes include 
fraud, firm strategy, and managerial underperformance, which correspond to 9 codes 
in our classification. All information on the codes for the causes of default and the 
definition of moral hazard is displayed in Appendix A.2. 
The estimations are performed at the firm level, unlike former tests at the loan 
level, since we explain the causes of default of the firms. We include several control 
variables defined before: RelationshipLength,  LimitedLiability,  UnknownRating, 
GoodRating. We also take some variables for the type of loans into account. As we 
focus now on the firm level rather than on the loan level, we consider the share of 
each type of loan in the total of loans of the company. Namely ShareOverdraft, 
ShareSTFixed,  ShareSTVariable,  ShareLTFixed,  ShareLTVariable,  ShareDiscount 
respectively represent dummy variables equal to one if overdrafts, short-term loans 
with fixed rate, short-term loans with variable rate, long-term loans with fixed rate, 
long-term loans with variable rate, discounts, represent more than 50% of the total 
loans of the company. 
We present two models testing respectively the presence, and the type of 
collateral. The explanatory power of both logit models estimated here is quite 
satisfactory, with a percentage of concordant observations between 66.8% and 71.1%.  
The first model tests whether the presence of at least one secured loan reduces 
the probability of moral hazard, by including a dummy variable (TCollateral) equal to 
one whether at least one loan to the firm is secured or zero else. The results displayed 
in table 5 show no significant sign for TCollateral, meaning that there is no 
significant impact on the occurrence of moral hazard when the loan is secured. This 
conclusion supports the role of both opposing arguments with respect to the 
relationship between moral hazard and the use of collateral. On the one hand, 
collateral is expected to reduce the problem of moral hazard by aligning borrower’s 
interest on bank’s. On the other hand, banks can sort borrowers thanks to the 
information they have on their quality and consequently they require higher collateral 
from the borrowers considered as risky. Moral hazard and observed-risk effects would 
then cancel each other out. 
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The second model deals with the type and the value of collateral. As estimations 
take now place at the firm level, we sum collateral per type for each firm 
(TotalIndivValue for guarantees from individuals and so on). The results are described 
in table 6. No variable accounting for collateral is significant, except TotalIndivValue, 
which is positive. It may appear as a surprising finding, as we could have expected 
that the moral hazard effect would dominate the observed-risk effect for outside 
collaterals. Indeed outside collaterals extend the limited liability of the borrower to 
external assets. 
However, we showed above in the model explaining risk premium that only 
three types of collateral are positively linked to risk premium, including guarantees 
from individuals. This result substantiates the observed-risk hypothesis, supporting 
the view that banks request the most attractive types of collateral from the riskiest 
borrowers to cover its risk. Therefore, following this line of reasoning, it is no 
surprise that if the presence of guarantees from individuals is positively associated to 
riskier borrowers, it is also linked with a greater probability of moral hazard. 
Turning to the control variables, we observe only two significant variables in all 
three models. First, LimitedLiability has a positive and significant sign, which result 
not surprisingly from the fact that firms with limited liability have more incentives to 
adopt moral hazard behavior. Second, the sign of UnknownRating is significantly 
positive, which is unsurprising as a borrower considering that his bank is short of 
information on him is more inclined to adopt moral hazard behavior. 
Therefore, our estimations do not tend to support the role of collateral to solve 
moral hazard problems, whatever the collateral. Indeed secured loans are not 
associated with a lower probability of moral hazard. Furthermore, moral hazard 
behavior is positively linked with loans secured with guarantees from individuals. The 
fact that moral hazard behavior is not positively associated with secured loans 
suggests nonetheless that an influence partly offsets the observed-risk effect. We can 
not compare precisely these results to any other study, as we are not aware of any 
work on this specific topic. Nevertheless, on a closely related issue, Jimenez and 
Saurina (2004) observed a greater probability of default for secured loans, supporting 
the observed-risk hypothesis. 
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V. Concluding remarks 
This research has analyzed empirically the motives of the use of collateral by 
banks provided by the theoretical literature. It is indeed of utmost importance to 
assess these motives, as there is a notable opposition between the effects expected by 
the theories based on information asymmetries and the common opinion of the 
bankers. Furthermore, a lack of empirical evidence still exists on this topic owing 
notably to the deficit of satisfactory data. 
We use an exceptional dataset of bank loans granted to French distressed firms 
to test the three theoretical motives of the use of collateral. Unlike former empirical 
studies, this dataset allows to test the influence of the collateral type on the motives of 
the use of collateral by banks. Furthermore, qualitative information on the causes of 
default defining the occurrence of moral hazard allows innovative investigation of the 
impact of collateral to solve moral hazard problems. 
Our main conclusions are as follows. First, collateral undoubtedly reduces loan 
loss in the event of default. Nonetheless, we show differences between types of 
collateral in terms of recovered value for a given initial value. Second, our findings 
suggest that any type of collateral does not solve adverse selection problems, in 
opposition with the theoretical argument of the collateral as a signalling instrument. 
Indeed, while this latter argument implies a trade-off between risk premium and 
collateral, we show a positive relationship between collateral and risk premium. This 
supports the observed-risk hypothesis according to which banks can sort borrowers 
thanks to the information they have on their quality. As a consequence, riskier 
companies would be charged with greater loan rates and asked more often to provide 
collateral. Third, we rather support the view that any type of collateral does not solve 
moral hazard. Secured loans are associated neither positively nor negatively with 
moral hazard behavior, suggesting that moral hazard and observed-risk effects cancel 
each other out. 
In summary, our work provides two major conclusions. First, two reasons seem 
to motivate the request of banks for collateral: to reduce loan loss in the event of 
default, to secure loans granted to risky borrowers following the observed-risk 
hypothesis. Second, information asymmetries in favor of the borrower do not tend to 
play a significant role in the decision of the bank to secure a loan. This latter 
conclusion may seem all the stronger as it contrasts with the results of many 
theoretical works on the use of collateral (e.g. Bester, 1985; Boot, Thakor and Udell,   20
1991). It supports however the rare empirical works on this topic (Berger and Udell, 
1990; Jimenez and Saurina, 2004). Furthermore, as notably mentioned by these latter 
works, it is in accordance with the perception of bankers linking the requirement of 
collateral with greater credit risk. 
Our results should however be considered with care, as their innovative aspects 
make them hard to compare to former works. To check the robustness of our findings 
on other datasets opens an avenue for further research. 
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Appendix 
 




Loan loss ratio  Loan loss divided by loan amount 
Risk premium  Risk premium, defined as the difference between the loan rate and a prime rate 
Moral hazard  Dummy variable equal to 1 if moral hazard is one of the causes of default 
Collateral variables 
Collateral  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is secured 
IndivValue  Initial value of guarantees from individuals to the loan amount 
FirmValue  Initial value of guarantees from companies to the loan amount 
OtherValue  Initial value of other kinds of collateral to the loan amount 
STAssetsValue  Initial value of short-term assets to the loan amount 
LTAssetsValue  Initial value of long-term assets other than mortgage to the loan amount 
MortgageValue  Initial value of mortgage to the loan amount 
AllOtherCollValue  Sum of the initial values of all other types of collateral divided by the loan amount 
(this variable varies with the type of collateral adopted as the explained variable in 
the estimation) 
IndivInitial  Log of the initial value of guarantees from individuals 
FirmInitial  Log of the initial value of guarantees from companies 
OtherInitial  Log of the initial value of other kinds of collateral 
STAssetsInitial  Log of the initial value of short-term assets 
LTAssetsInitial  Log of the initial value of long-term assets other than mortgage 
MortgageInitial  Log of the initial value of mortgage 
IndivRecovered  Log of the recovered value of guarantees from individuals 
FirmRecovered  Log of the recovered value of guarantees from companies 
OtherRecovered  Log of the recovered value of other kinds of collateral 
STAssetsRecovered  Log of the recovered value of short-term assets 
LTAssetsRecovered  Log of the recovered value of long-term assets other than mortgage 
MortgageRecovered  Log of the recovered value of mortgage 
TCollateral  Dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one loan to the firm is secured 
TotalIndivValue  Log of the initial value of total guarantees from individuals 
TotalFirmValue  Log of the initial value of total guarantees from companies 
TotalOtherValue  Log of the initial value of total guarantees from other kinds of collateral 
TotalSTAssetsValue  Log of the initial value of total guarantees from short-term assets 
TotalLTAssetsValue  Log of the initial value of total guarantees from long-term assets other than 
mortgage 
TotalMortgageValue  Log of the initial value of total guarantees from mortgage 
Control variables 
LoanSize  Log of the loan amount 
RelationshipLength  Log of the length of the relationship bank-borrower 
Duration  Log of the duration of the loan 
LimitedLiability  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the legal status of the company includes limited 
liability 
Excess  Used amount to the initial granted amount of loan 
EAD  Log of exposure at default (all the due amounts plus the discounted commitments) 
Group  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is part of a group 
UnknownRating  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the last internal rating estimated by the bank before 
the default of the borrower is unknown because of the lack of satisfactory 
information 
GoodRating  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the last internal rating estimated by the bank before 
the default of the borrower considers the borrower as solvent 
Overdraft  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is an overdraft 
STFixed  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is short-term with fixed rate   22
STVariable  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is short-term with variable rate 
LTFixed  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is long-term with fixed rate 
LTVariable  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is long-term with variable rate 
Discount  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is discount 
ShareOverdraft  Share of overdrafts in the total of loans of the company 
ShareSTFixed  Share of short-term loans with fixed rate in the total of loans of the company 
ShareSTVariable  Share of short-term loans with variable rate in the total of loans of the company 
ShareLTFixed  Share of long-term loans with fixed rate in the total of loans of the company 
ShareLTVariable  Share of long-term loans with variable rate in the total of loans of the company 






A.2 Codes for causes of default 
 
Moral hazard is measured, depending on the causes of default of the firm. Our 
dataset includes full qualitative information on these causes of default. This literal 
information, which is written in the credit file by the bank employee in charge of the 
recovery process, was classified in 49 codes. The codes are the following ones, 
gathered in 7 categories: 
Prospect problems: sudden loss of clients, default of major clients, wrong evaluation 
of the market, sale prices too low, obsolete products, loss of market share (underlying 
reduction of the demand). 
Firm strategy: firm youth (lack of experience), voluntary dissolution, failure of major 
projects, conscious acceptance of nonprofitable markets. 
Cost and production structure: overcapacities or overinvestment, asset depreciation, 
excessive operating costs, excessive personnel expenses, sudden loss of a supplier or 
refusal to accept terms of payment, obsolete production process, underinvestment. 
Financial difficulties: extension of the terms of payment of clients, contagion of 
subsidiaries’loss, reduction of the terms of payment required by suppliers, speculation 
of the firm, exchange issues, end of support by mother company, deficit in equity, 
refusal of loan (to the company), end of subsidies, excessive interest rates. 
Problems with information and management: deficient accounting system or deficient 
information system, competence problems (lack of competence), disagreement 
between managers, excessive withdrawals, insufficient provisioning, misappreciation 
of production costs, wrong evaluation of stocks, difficulties in the transfer of the firm 
/ difficult merger or acquisition.   23
Accidental causes: fraud, extension of a bankruptcy process, lawsuit with public 
partners, lawsuit with private partners, death / disease / escape of the manager, 
accident, social problems in the firm, other. 
Macroeconomic factors of fragility: unfavorable evolution of the exchange rate, 
increase in competition, reduction in industry demand, exceptional event (war, natural 
disaster,…), public policy less favorable to the industry, period with credit rationing, 
macroeconomic increase of operating costs (raw materials, …). 
 
Following theoretical literature on moral hazard, we consider as moral hazard 
all the causes linked to underinvestment, asset substitution and weak managerial 
effort. Namely, we then take all the causes connected to the internal reasons of faulty 
management, which include fraud, firm strategy, and managerial underperformance. 
Moral hazard behavior is then assumed for each firm for each at least one of the 
following 9 codes in our classification is mentioned as one cause of default: conscious 
acceptance of nonprofitable markets, overcapacities and overinvestment, 
underinvestment, deficient accounting system / deficient information system, 
competence problems (lack of competence), disagreement between managers, 
excessive withdrawals, insufficient provisioning, fraud. 
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Table 1 
Means and frequencies for main variables 
 
The table below provides means and frequencies computed on our full dataset of 564 loans.. Definition 
of variables appear in the appendix A.1.  
 
Firm characteristics (mean)  Type of collateral (frequency) 
Turnover (thousand €)  11,970.9 Guarantees from individuals  43.6% 
Relationship Length (years)  6.65  Guarantees from companies  13.7% 
Moral hazard  26.59%  Other kinds of collateral  8.7% 
Characteristics of credit line (mean)  Short-term assets  14.4% 
LoanSize (thousand €)  436.3  Long-term assets other than mortgage  15.2% 
LossRatio 55.07%  Mortgage 18.6% 
Risk premium  1.62%  Recovery rate (mean) 
Collateral 74.5%  Guarantees  from  individuals  10% 
Type of credit line (frequency)  Guarantees from companies  39% 
Overdraft  20.92%  Other kinds of collateral  32% 
STFixed 6.56%  Short-term  assets  21% 
STVariable  4.26%  Long-term assets other than mortgage  11% 
LTFixed 37.23%  Mortgage 21% 
LTVariable 8.16%     
Discount 13.65%     
Other credit lines  9.22%     
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Table 2 
Collateral and reduction of loan loss: secured or not (OLS) 
 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix A.1. The dependent variable is Loan loss ratio. *, **, 
*** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. N=564. 
 
Variable Coefficient  t-statistic 
Intercept 0.983***  7.30 
Collateral -0.156***  2.57 
LimitedLiability 0.162*  1.92 
Group 0.039  0.74 
UnknownRating 0.039  0.61 
GoodRating 0.048  0.73 
STFixed 0.312***  2.76 
STVariable 0.405***  3.00 
LTFixed 0.232***  3.41 
LTVariable 0.163  1.57 
Discount 0.129  1.54 
EAD -0.073***  4.20 
Excess -0.272***  20.09 
Adjusted R²  0.4890   
Condition Index  15.67   
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Table 3 
Collateral and reduction of loan loss (Three Stage Least Squares) 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix A.1. The dependent variable is on the top of the column. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 
10%, 5% or 1% level. Adjusted R²=0.3432. N=420. 
 
IndivRecovered FirmRecovered OtherRecovered  STAssetsRecovered  LTAssetsRecovered  MortgageRecovered   
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
Intercept  0.090 0.23 0.431 1.47 0.172 0.43  0.617**  2.41 0.193 0.71  0.173  0.34 
IndivInitial  0.113**  2.91              
FirmInitial     0.391***  7.51            
OtherInitial       0.349***  5.96          
STAssetsInitial         0.222***  4.93       
LTAssetsInitial           0.111***  3.98    
MortgageInitial               0.244***  4.33 
IndivRecovered      -0.191  0.81 -0.550* 1.96  -0.174  0.84  -0.329*  1.75  -0.728**  2.35 
FirmRecovered  -0.211* 1.67      -0.277* 1.91  -0.030  0.25  -0.228***  2.62  -0.352**  2.11 
OtherRecovered  -0.167 1.28 -0.087 0.75      0.031 0.26  -0.149  1.61  -0.334**  2.10 
STAssetsRecovered  -0.348*  1.70 -0.206 1.03 -0.451 1.84      -0.240  1.46  -0.649**  2.51 
LTAssetsRecovered  -0.257 0.81 -0.180 0.70  -0.563*  1.81 -0.003 0.01      -0.602 1.60 
MortgageRecovered -0.220*  1.72  -0.016  0.12 -0.299** 2.04  -0.092  0.84  -0.152  1.53     
LimitedLiability  -0.221 0.93 -0.259 1.38 -0.312 1.27 -0.259 1.60  -0.177  1.03 -0.455 1.57 
Group  -0.084 0.55 -0.153 1.29 -0.099 0.62  -0.248**  2.46  -0.038  0.35 -0.119 0.59 
UnknownRating  -0.010 0.06 -0.201 1.61 0.008 0.05 -0.147 1.30  -0.011  0.10 -0.045 0.21 
GoodRating  0.294 1.57 0.122 0.76  0.366*  1.84 -0.075 0.46 0.271** 2.13 0.414* 1.67 
STFixed  -0.247 0.80 0.387 1.52 -0.222 0.70 -0.009 0.04  -0.138  0.65 -0.521 1.32 
STVariable  -0.428 1.05  -0.727**  2.36 -0.658 1.55 -0.355 1.23  -0.540**  1.98 -0.727 1.38 
LTFixed  -0.204 1.09 -0.009 0.06  -0.328*  1.69 -0.149 1.12 -0.242* 1.83 -0.391 1.62 
LTVariable  -0.002 0.01  0.460**  2.25 -0.169 0.58  -0.406*  1.89  0.077  0.41 0.106 0.30 
Discount  -0.650**  2.29  -0.343  1.21 -0.645* 1.82  -0.507**  2.26 -0.451** 2.01  -0.976**  2.50 
EAD  0.165*  1.90 0.024 0.26  0.236**  2.37 0.026 0.31 0.119* 1.75  0.326***  3.19 
Excess  -0.019 0.58 0.026 0.96 -0.040 1.22 -0.005 0.20  -0.023  1.04 -0.043 1.04   28
Table 4 
Collateral and risk premium (Three Stage Least Squares) 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix A.1. The dependent variable is on the top of the column. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 
10%, 5% or 1% level. Adjusted R²=0.3391. N=303. 
 
Risk Premium  IndivValue  FirmValue  OtherValue  STAssetsValue  LTAssetsValue  MortageValue   
Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef.  t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
Intercept  0.038***  9.17 -10.589*** 5.40 -6.760*** 7.23 -3.145*** 5.24  -7.466*** 8.05  -10.417***  6.37  -10.145***  5.95 
IndivValue  0.004***  4.80  -   -  -    -    -    -   
FirmValue  0.004***  18.25  -   -  -    -    -    -   
OtherValue  0.003***  14.70  -   -  -    -    -    -   
STAssetsValue  0.004***  9.41  -   -  -    -    -    -   
LTAssetsValue  0.004***  4.22  -   -  -    -    -    -   
MortgageValue  0.004***  4.88  -   -  -    -    -    -   
Risk  Premium      269.589*** 6.65 170.95*** 8.44 79.315***  5.71 190.313***  9.67  266.738*** 7.86 259.865*** 7.35 
AllOtherCollValue      -1.132*** 37.89  -0.675***  15.45  -0.314***  6.92  -0.763*** 22.80 -1.082*** 37.39 -1.046*** 38.57 
LoanSize  -0.460E-3  0.74  0.133  1.09 0.081 1.55  0.046*  1.84 0.091*  1.69 0.132 1.29 0.125 1.18 
RelationshipLength -0.002***  2.68  0.610***  3.34 0.383*** 4.71 0.205***  4.73  0.426***  5.17  0.601***  3.96  0.581***  3.67 
Duration -0.970E-3  1.16  0.268*  1.68  0.181***  2.65  0.074** 2.19 0.195***  2.78 0.263** 1.99  0.255*  1.85 
STFixed  -0.019*** 4.98  5.096***  4.85 3.281*** 6.77 1.518*** 5.12  3.557*** 7.30 4.992*** 5.70 4.863*** 5.33 
STVariable  -0.018*** 4.37  4.697***  4.64 2.983*** 6.41 1.432*** 5.16  3.279*** 7.02 4.595*** 5.45 4.477*** 5.10 
LTFixed  -0.019*** 6.32  5.180***  5.61 3.285*** 7.48 1.550*** 5.51  3.619*** 8.31 5.060*** 6.58 4.941*** 6.16 
LTVariable  -0.020*** 5.38  5.414***  5.40 3.418*** 7.24 1.778*** 6.15  3.769*** 8.03 5.259*** 6.30 5.158*** 5.92 
Discount  -0.020*** 4.81  5.479***  4.98 3.459*** 6.73 1.582*** 4.98  3.889*** 7.63 5.390*** 5.88 5.247*** 5.49 
LimitedLiability -   0.112  1.39  0.137**  2.28  0.014 0.28  0.163***  2.96  0.128*  1.75  0.137*  1.93 
Group  -0.003**  2.03  0.825***  2.67 0.572*** 4.31 0.227*** 3.23  0.552*** 4.01 0.787*** 3.07 0.764*** 2.86 
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Table 5 
Collateral and moral hazard: at least one loan to the firm is secured (Logit) 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix A.1. The dependent variable is the dummy variable 
Moral hazard, taking the value of 1 when moral hazard is one of the causes of default, and 0 else. *, **, 
*** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. N=197. 
 
 
Variable Coefficient  Chi-Square 
Intercept -2.987***  6.91 
TCollateral 0.539  0.93 
RelationshipLength -0.010  0.01 
LimitedLiability 1.563**  5.63 
UnknownRating 0.705*  2.90 
GoodRating 0.082  0.03 
ShareOverdraft 0.056  0.01 
ShareSTFixed -5.534  2.51 
ShareSTVariable 0.333  0.17 
ShareLTFixed 0.064  0.01 
ShareLTVariable -0.419  0.30 
ShareDiscount -0.656  0.52 
    
-2 log likelihood  209.550   
Association of prediction probabilities and observed responses 
Concordant 66.8   
Tied 1.6     30
Table 6 
Collateral and moral hazard: types and values of collateral (Logit) 
 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix A.1. The dependent variable is the dummy variable 
Moral hazard, taking the value of 1 when moral hazard is one of the causes of default, and 0 else. *, **, 
*** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. N=197. 
 
Variable Coefficient  Chi-Square 
Intercept -2.703**  5.88 
TotalIndivValue 0.118*  2.95 
TotalFirmValue 0.013  0.02 
TotalOtherValue -0.027  0.08 
TotalSTAssetsValue -0.155  1.88 
TotalLTAssetsValue -0.002  0.01 
TotalMortgageValue 0.036  0.23 
RelationshipLength 0.030  0.02 
LimitedLiability 1.605**  5.25 
UnknownRating 0.823*  3.63 
GoodRating 0.130  0.07 
ShareOverdraft -0.223  0.06 
ShareSTFixed -5.901  2.43 
ShareSTVariable 0.135  0.03 
ShareLTFixed -0.228  0.11 
ShareLTVariable -0.648  0.63 
ShareDiscount -0.875  0.86 
    
-2 log likelihood  204.013   
Association of prediction probabilities and observed responses 
Concordant 71.1   
Tied 0.4   
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